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Abstract. A simple game (N, v) is given by a set N of n players and
a partition of 2N into a set L of losing coalitions L with value v(L) = 0
that is closed under taking subsets and a set W of winning coalitions W
with v(W ) = 1. Simple games with α = minp>0 maxW∈W,L∈L
p(L)
p(W )
< 1
are exactly the weighted voting games. We show that α 6 1
4
n for ev-
ery simple game (N, v), confirming the conjecture of Freixas and Kurz
(IJGT, 2014). For complete simple games, Freixas and Kurz conjectured
that α = O(
√
n). We prove this conjecture up to a lnn factor. We also
prove that for graphic simple games, that is, simple games in which
every minimal winning coalition has size 2, computing α is NP-hard,
but polynomial-time solvable if the underlying graph is bipartite. More-
over, we show that for every graphic simple game, deciding if α < a is
polynomial-time solvable for every fixed a > 0.
1 Introduction
Cooperative Game Theory provides a mathematical framework for capturing
situations where subsets of agents may form a coalition in order to obtain some
collective profit or share some collective cost. Formally, a cooperative game (with
transferable utilities) consists of a pair (N, v), where N is a set of n agents
called players and v : 2N → R+ is a value function that satisfies v(∅) = 0.
In our context, the value v(S) of a coalition S ⊆ N represents the profit for
S if all players in S choose to collaborate with (only) each other. The central
problem in cooperative game theory is to allocate the total profit v(N) of the
grand coalition N to the individual players i ∈ N in a “fair” way. To this end
various solution concepts such as the core, Shapley value or nucleolus have been
designed; see [29] for an overview. For example, core solutions try to allocate
the total profit such that every coalition S ⊆ N gets at least v(S). This is of
course not always possible, that is, the core might be empty. This leads to related
⋆ A partial answer to the conjecture of Freixas and Kurz appeared, together with some
results of this paper, in an extended abstract published in the proceedings of SAGT
2018 [20].
questions like: “How much do we need to spend in total if we want to give at
least v(S) to each coalition S ⊆ N?”. In the specific case of simple games (cf.
below) where v takes only values 0 and 1, classifying coalitions into “losing” and
“winning” coalitions, one may also ask: “How much do we have to give in the
worst case to a losing coalition if we want to give at least v(S) = 1 to each
winning coalition?”
As mentioned above, we study simple games. Simple games form a clas-
sical class of games, which are well studied; see also the book of Taylor and
Zwicker [33]. The notion of being simple means that every coalition either has
some equal amount of power or no power at all. Formally, a cooperative game
(N, v) is simple if v is a monotone 0–1 function with v(∅) = 0 and v(N) = 1,
so v(S) ∈ {0, 1} for all S ⊆ N and v(S) 6 v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T . In other
words, if (N, v) is simple, then there is a set W ⊆ 2N of winning coalitions W
that have value v(W ) = 1 and a set L ⊆ 2Nof losing coalitions L that have
value v(L) = 0. Note that N ∈ W , ∅ ∈ L and W ∪ L = 2N . The monotonicity
of v implies that subsets of losing coalitions are losing and supersets of winning
coalitions are winning. A winning coalition W is minimal if every proper subset
of W is losing, and a losing coalition L is maximal if every proper superset of L
is winning.
A simple game is a weighted voting game if there exists a payoff vector p ∈ Rn+
such that a coalition S is winning if p(S) > 1 and losing if p(S) < 1. Weighted
voting games are also known as weighted majority games and form one of the
most popular classes of simple games.
However, it is easy to construct simple games that are not weighted voting
games. We give an example below, but in fact there are many important sim-
ple games that are not weighted voting games, and the relationship between
weighted voting games and simple games is not yet fully understood. Therefore,
Gvozdeva, Hemaspaandra, and Slinko [17] introduced a parameter α, called the
critical threshold value, to measure the “distance” of a simple game to the class
of weighted voting games:
α = α(N, v) = min
p>0
max
W∈W
L∈L
p(L)
p(W )
. (1)
A simple game (N, v) is a weighted voting game if and only if α < 1. This
follows from observing that each optimal solution p of (1) can be scaled to satisfy
p(W ) > 1 for all winning coalitions W . The scaling enables us to reformulate
the critical threshold value as follows:
α = α(N, v) = min
p∈Q(W)
max
L∈L
p(L) ,
where
Q(W) = {p ∈ RN | p(W ) > 1 for every W ∈ W , p > 0} .
The following concrete example of a simple game (N, v) that is not a weighted
voting game and that has in fact a large value of α was given in [13]:
Example 1 Let N = {1, . . . , n} for some even integer n > 4, and let the mini-
mal winning coalitions be the pairs {1, 2}, {2, 3}, . . .{n− 1, n}, {n, 1}. Then
Q(W) = {p ∈ RN | p1 + p2 > 1, p2 + p3 > 1, . . . , pn + p1 > 1, p > 0} .
This means that p(N) > 12n for every p ∈ Q(W). Then, for every p ∈ Q(W) and
for at least one of the two loosing coalitions {2, 4, 6, . . . , n} or {1, 3, 5, . . . , n−1},
we have p(L) > 14n, showing that α >
1
4n. On the other hand, it is easily seen
that p ≡ 12 satisfies p(W ) > 1 for all winning coalitions and p(L) 6 14n for all
losing coalitions, showing that α 6 14n. Thus α =
1
4n.
This example led the authors of [13] to the following conjecture:
Conjecture 1 ([13]) For every simple game (N, v), it holds that α 6 14n.
Our Results. Section 2 contains our main result. In this section we reformulate
and strengthen Conjecture 1 and then we prove the obtained strengthening.
In Section 3 we consider a subclass of simple games based on a natural desir-
ability order [21]. A simple game (N, v) is complete if the players can be ordered
by a complete, transitive ordering , say, 1  2  · · ·  n, indicating that higher
ranked players have more "power" than lower ranked players. More precisely,
i  j means that v(S ∪ i) > v(S ∪ j) for any coalition S ⊆ N\{i, j}. The class
of complete simple games properly contains all weighted voting games [15]. For
complete simple games, we show an asymptotically upper bound on α, namely
α = O(
√
n lnn). This bound matches, up to a lnn factor, the lower bound of
Ω(
√
n) in [13], where the bound Ω(
√
n) is conjectured to be tight in [13]. Intu-
itively, complete simple games are much closer to weighted voting games than
arbitrary simple games. So, from this perspective, our result seems to support
the hypothesis that α is indeed a sensible measure for the distance to weighted
voting games.
In Section 4 we discuss some algorithmic and complexity issues. We focus
on instances where all minimal winning coalitions have size 2. We say that such
simple games are graphic, as they can conveniently be described by a graph
G = (N,E) with vertex set N and edge set E = {ij | {i, j} is winning}. For
graphic simple games we show that computing α is NP-hard in general, but
polynomial-time solvable if the underlying graph G = (N,E) is bipartite, or if
α is known to be small (less than a fixed number a).
Related Work. Due to their practical applications in voting systems, com-
puter operating systems and model resource allocation (see e.g. [3,7]), structural
and computational complexity aspects for solution concepts for weighted voting
games have been thoroughly investigated [10,11,14,17,26].
Another way to measure the distance of a simple game to the class of weighted
voting games is to use the dimension of a simple game [32], which is the small-
est number of weighted voting games whose intersection equals a given simple
game. However, computing the dimension of a simple game is NP-hard [8], and
the largest dimension of a simple game with n players is 2n−o(n) [24]. Moreover,
α may be arbitrarily large for simple games with dimension larger than 1. Hence
there is no direct relation between the two distance measures. Gvozdeva, Hemas-
paandra, and Slinko [17] introduced two other distance parameters as well. One
measures the power balance between small and large coalitions. The other one
allows multiple thresholds instead of threshold 1 only.
For graphic simple games, it is natural to take the number of players n as the
input size for answering complexity questions, but in general simple games may
have different representations. For instance, one can list all minimal winning
coalitions or all maximal losing coalitions. Under these two representations the
problem of deciding if α < 1, that is, if a given simple game is a weighted voting
game, is also polynomial-time solvable. This follows from results of [18,28], as
shown in [14]. The latter paper also showed that the same result holds if the
representation is given by listing all winning coalitions or all losing coalitions.
As mentioned, a crucial case in our study is when the simple game is graphic,
that is, defined on some graph G = (N,E). In the corresponding matching game
a coalition S ⊆ N has value v(S) equal to the maximum size of a matching in
the subgraph of G induced by S. One of the most prominent solution concepts
is the core of a game, defined by core(N, v) := {p ∈ Rn | p(N) = v(N), p(S) >
v(S) ∀S ⊆ N}. Matching games are not simple games. Yet their core constraints
are readily seen to simplify to p > 0 and pi+pj > 1 for all ij ∈ E. Classical solu-
tion concepts, such as the core and core-related ones like least core, nucleolus or
nucleon are well studied for matching games, see, for example, [4,5,12,22,23,31].
2 The Proof of the Conjecture
To prove Conjecture 1 we reformulate, strengthen and only then verify it. Our
approach is inspired by the work of Abdi, Cornuéjols and Lee on identically self-
blocking clutters [1]. A coalition C ⊆ N is called a cover of W if C has at least
one common player with every coalition in W . We call the collection of covers
of W the blocker of W and denote it by b(W)5 [9]. We claim that
L = {N \ C |C ∈ b(W)} .
In order to see this, first suppose that there exists a cover C ∈ b(W) such that
N \ C /∈ L. As L ∪ W = 2N , this means that N \ C ∈ W . However, as C
contains no player from N \C, this contradicts our assumption that C ∈ b(W).
Now suppose that there exists a losing coalition L ∈ L such that C = N \ L
does not belong to b(W . Then, by definition, there exists a winning coalition
W ∈ W with C ∩W = ∅. As C ∩W = ∅, we find that W ⊆ N \ C = L. Then,
by the monotonicity property of simple games, L must be winning as well, a
contradiction.
5 Usually, the notion of a blocker is defined as the collection of minimal covers, but
for simplicity of exposition, we define it as the collection of all covers.
As L = {N \C |C ∈ b(W)}, the critical threshold value can be reformulated
as follows
α = min
p∈Q(W)
max
L∈L
p(L) = min
p∈Q(W)
max
C∈b(W)
p(N \ C) =
min
p∈Q(W)
max
q∈Q(W)
q∈{0,1}N
〈p,1− q〉 .
Here, 〈p, q〉 stands for the scalar product of two vectors p and q. To see the last
equality, for a cover C we can define a corresponding vector q ∈ {0, 1}N ∩Q(W)
by setting qi = 1 if i ∈ C and qi = 0 otherwise.
Conjecture 1 (reformulated) For a simple game with n players and the col-
lection of winning coalitions W, we have
min
p∈Q(W)
max
q∈Q(W)
q∈{0,1}N
〈p,1− q〉 6 n/4 .
Next, we prove Theorem 3, which is a strengthening of Conjecture 1. For the
proof we need the following straightforward remark, which we leave as an exer-
cise. Here, we write ‖p‖2 =
√
p21 + . . .+ p
2
n for a vector p ∈ Rn.
Remark 2 Let P be a polyhedron and let p⋆ be the optimal solution of the
program min{‖p‖2 | p ∈ P}. Then p⋆ is an optimal solution of the linear program
min{〈p⋆, q〉 | q ∈ P}.
Theorem 3 (Strengthening of Conjecture 1) For a simple game with n play-
ers and the collection of winning coalitions W, we have
min
p∈Q(W)
max
q∈Q(W)
〈p,1− q〉 6 n/4 .
In particular, if p⋆ is the optimal solution for the program
min{‖p‖2 | p ∈ Q(W)} ,
then
max
q∈Q(W)
〈p⋆,1− q〉 6 n/4 .
Proof. Consider the unique optimal solution p⋆ for the program min{‖p‖2 | p ∈
Q(W)}. By Remark 2, p⋆ is an optimal solution for the programmin{〈p⋆, q〉 | q ∈
Q(W)}. Thus, p⋆ is an optimal solution for the program maxq∈Q(W)〈p⋆,1− q〉.
Thus, we have
max
q∈Q(W)
〈p⋆,1− q〉 = 〈p⋆,1− p⋆〉 = n
4
− 〈1
2
1− p⋆, 1
2
1− p⋆〉 6 n
4
,
finishing the proof. ⊓⊔
Let us discuss when Conjecture 1 provides a tight upper bound for the critical
threshold value. The next theorem shows that if the upper bound in Conjecture 1
is tight, then this fact can be certified in the same way as in Example 1.
Theorem 4 For a simple game with n players and the collection of winning
coalitions W and the collection of losing coalitions L, we have
α = min
p∈Q(W)
max
L∈L
p(L) = n/4
if and only if 2
n
1 lies in the convex hull of the characteristic vectors of winning
coalitions and 121 lies in the convex hull of the characteristic vectors of losing
coalitions.
Proof. Clearly, if 2
n
1 lies in the convex hull of the characteristic vectors of win-
ning coalitions and 121 lies in the convex hull of the characteristic vectors of
losing coalitions, then for every p ∈ Q(W) we have
max
L∈L
p(L) > 〈p, 1
2
1〉 = n
4
〈p, 2
n
1〉 > n
4
,
showing that α > n/4 and hence α = n/4 by Theorem 3.
On the other hand, from the proof of Theorem 3 we know that if α = n/4 then
p⋆ = 121 is an optimal solution for min{〈p⋆, q〉 | q ∈ Q(W)} with value n/4. Let
us show that 2
n
1 lies in the convex hull of the characteristic vectors of winning
coalitions. To do that consider an optimal dual solution y⋆ for the program
min{〈p⋆, q〉 | q ∈ Q(W)}. Using complementary slackness it is straightforward to
show that 4
n
y⋆ provides coefficients of a convex combination of characteristic
vectors of winning coalitions, where the convex combination equals 2
n
1.
In the same way as the proof of Theorem 3, we could show that
α 6 max
q∈Q(W)
q∈{0,1}N
〈q⋆,1− q〉 = 〈q⋆,1− q⋆〉 = n
4
− 〈1
2
1− q⋆, 1
2
1− q⋆〉 6 n
4
,
where q⋆ is the optimal solution for the program
min{‖q‖2 | q ∈ conv{r ∈ {0, 1}N | r ∈ Q(W)}} .
Thus, if α equals n/4, then q⋆ = 121 and
1
21 lies in conv{r ∈ {0, 1}N | r ∈
Q(W)}. Hence, if α equals n/4, then 1− q⋆ = 121 lies in the convex hull of the
characteristic vectors of losing coalitions, finishing the proof. ⊓⊔
3 Complete Simple Games
Intuitively, the class of complete simple games is “closer” to weighted voting
games than general simple games. The next result quantifies this expectation.
Theorem 1. For a complete simple game (N, v), it holds that α 6
√
n lnn.
Proof. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players and assume without loss of
generality that 1  2  · · ·  n. Let k ∈ N be the largest number such that
{k, . . . , n} is winning. For i = 1, . . . , k, let si denote the smallest size of a winning
coalition in {i, . . . , n}. Define pi := 1/si for i = 1, . . . , k and pi := pk for i =
k + 1, . . . , n. Thus, obviously, p1 > . . . > pk = · · · = pn.
Consider a winning coalition W ⊆ N and let i be the first player in W (with
respect to ). If |W | 6 √n, then si 6 |W | 6
√
n and hence p(W ) > pi =
1
si
>
1√
n
. On the other hand, if |W | > √n, then p(W ) > √npk >
√
n 1
n
= 1√
n
.
For a losing coalition L ⊆ N , we conclude that |L ∩ {1, . . . , i}| 6 si − 1
(otherwise L would dominate the winning coalition of size si in {i, . . . , n}). So
p(L) is bounded by max
∑k
i=1 xi
1
si
subject to
∑i
j=1 xj 6 si − 1, i = 1, . . . , k.
The optimal solution of this maximization problem is x1 = s1− 1 and xi = si−
si−1 for i = 2, . . . k. Hence p(L) 6 (s1−1) 1s1 +(s2−s1) 1s2 + · · ·+(sk−sk−1) 1sk 6
1
2 + · · ·+ 1sk 6 lnn. Summarizing, we obtain p(L)/p(W ) 6
√
n lnn. ⊓⊔
In [13] it is conjectured that α = O(
√
n) holds for complete simple games. In
the same paper a lower bound of order
√
n is given, as well as specific subclasses
of complete simple games for which α = O(
√
n) can be proven.
4 Algorithmic Aspects
A fundamental question concerns the complexity of our original problem (1),
i.e., the complexity of computing the critical threshold value of a simple game.
For general simple games this depends on how the game in question is given,
and we refer to Section 1 for a discussion. Here we concentrate on the “graphic”
case.
Proposition 1. Computing αG for bipartite graphs G can be done in polynomial
time.
Proof. Let P ⊆ Rn be the set of feasible payoffs (satisfying p > 0 and pi+pj > 1
for ij ∈ E). For α ∈ R, let Pα := {p ∈ P | p(L) 6 α for all independent L ⊆ N}.
Thus αG = min{α | Pα 6= ∅}. The separation problem for Pα (for any given
α) is efficiently solvable. Given p ∈ Rn, we can check feasibility and whether
max{p(L) | L ⊆ N independent} 6 α by solving a corresponding maximum
weight independent set problem in the bipartite graph G. Thus we can, for
any given α ∈ R, apply the ellipsoid method to either compute some p ∈ Pα or
conclude that Pα = ∅. Binary search then exhibits the minimum value for which
Pα is non-empty; binary search works indeed in polynomial time as the optimal
α has size polynomially bounded in n, which follows from observing that
α = min{a | pi+pj > 1 ∀ij ∈ E, p(L)−a 6 0 ∀L ⊆ N independent, p > 0} (2)
can be computed by solving a linear system of n constraints defining an optimal
basic solution of the above linear program. ⊓⊔
The proof of Proposition 1 also applies to other classes of graphs, such as
claw-free graphs (see [6]) in which finding a weighted maximum independent set
is polynomial-time solvable. In general, the problem is NP-hard.
Proposition 2. Computing αG for arbitrary graphs G is NP-hard.
Proof. Let G′ = (N ′, E′) and G′′ = (N ′′, E′′) be two disjoint copies of a graph
G = (N,E) with independence number k. For each i′ ∈ N ′ and j′′ ∈ N ′′ add an
edge i′j′′ if and only if i = j or ij ∈ E and call the resulting graphG∗ = (N∗, E∗).
We claim that αG∗ = k/2 (thus computing αG∗ is as difficult as computing k).
First note that the independent sets in G∗ are exactly the sets L∗ ⊆ N∗
that arise from an independent set L ⊆ N in G by splitting L into two com-
plementary sets L1 and L2 and defining L
∗ := L′1 ∪ L′′2 . Hence, p ≡ 12 on N∗
yields max p(L∗) = k/2 where the maximum is taken over all independent sets
L∗ ⊆ N∗ in G∗. This shows that αG∗ 6 k/2.
Conversely, let p∗ be any feasible payoff in G∗, that is, p∗ > 0 and p∗i +p
∗
j > 1
for all ij ∈ E∗. Let L ⊆ N be a maximum independent set of size k in G and
construct L∗ by including for each i ∈ L either i′ or i′′ in L∗, whichever has
p-value at least 12 . Then, by construction, L
∗ is an independent set in G∗ with
p∗(L∗) > k/2, showing that αG∗ > k/2. ⊓⊔
Summarizing, for graphic simple games, computing αG is as least as hard
as computing the size of a maximum independent in G. For our last result we
assume that a is a fixed integer, that is, a is not part of the input.
Proposition 3. For every fixed a > 0, it is possible to decide if αG 6 a in
polynomial time for an arbitrary graph G = (N,E).
Proof. Let k = 2⌈a+ ǫ⌉ for some ǫ > 0. By brute-force, we can check in O(n2k)
time if N contains 2k vertices {u1, . . . , uk} ∪ {v1, . . . , vk} that induce k disjoint
copies of P2, that is, paths Pi = uivi of length 2 for i = 1, . . . , k with no
edges joining any two of these paths. If so, then the condition p(ui) + p(vi) > 1
implies that one of ui, vi, say ui, must receive a payoff p(ui) >
1
2 , and hence
U = {u1, . . . , uk} has p(U) > k/2 > a. As U is an independent set, α(G) > a.
Now assume that G does not contain k disjoint copies of P2 as an induced
subgraph, that is, G is kP2-free. For every s > 1, the number of maximal inde-
pendent sets in a sP2-free graphs is n
O(s) due to a result of Balas and Yu [2].
Tsukiyama, Ide, Ariyoshi, and Shirakawa [34] show how to enumerate all maxi-
mal independent sets of a graph G on n vertices and m edges using time O(nm)
per independent set. Hence we can find all maximal independent sets of G and
thus solve, in polynomial time, the linear program (2). Then it remains to check
if the solution found satisfies α 6 a. ⊓⊔
5 Conclusions
We have strengthened and proven the conjecture of [13] on simple games (Con-
jecture 1) and showed a number of computational complexity results for graphic
simple games. Moreover, we considered complete simple games and proved a
stronger upper bound for this class of games. It remains to tighten the upper
bound for complete simple games to O(
√
n) if possible. In order to classify simple
games, many more subclasses of simple games have been identified in the liter-
ature. Besides the two open problems, no optimal bounds for α are known for
other subclasses of simple games, such as strong, proper, or constant-sum games,
that is, where v(S) + v(N\S) > 1, v(S) + v(N\S) 6 1, or v(S) + v(N\S) = 1
for all S ⊆ N , respectively.
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